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ABSTRACT 
This article observes a startling new appellate jurisdictional battle 
waged by regional circuit courts to chip away the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive jurisdiction in patent cases. The Eleventh Circuit took an 
unprecedented step by engaging in patent claim construction and 
infringement under literal infringement analysis and the doctrine of 
equivalents analysis. In a case of first impression, the Eleventh 
Circuit asserted that it legitimately has appellate jurisdiction to 
decide cases involving substantive patent law. Instead of grabbing 
jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit, through its Chief Judge, grabbed 
public attention by advocating for the abolishment of the Federal 
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. The Chief Judge 
announced that the Seventh Circuit is able and ready to hear patent 
cases. Why do regional circuit courts now want to assert jurisdiction 
over patent cases? What implications can be drawn from the 
jurisdictional battle? Are their assertions of jurisdiction over patent 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Circuit has enjoyed its rise in prominence, as patent 
cases have attracted media attention across the nation and the world.1 
A little more than three decades since its creation by a congressional 
act2 to inject uniformity into the patent law system3 and to discourage 
forum shopping,4 the Federal Circuit saw its patent docket rise from 
121 cases in 1983 to 448 cases in 2013.5 Companies aggressively 
procure patents for every imaginable invention.6 Patent applications 
leaped fivefold from 117,987 in 1982 to 609,052 in 2013.7 The latest 
overhaul of patent law, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act8 for 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally Apple and Samsung Agree to Drop Patent Lawsuits Outside US, THE GUARDIAN, 
Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/06/apple-samsung-drop-patent-
lawsuits-outside-usa; Andrew Chung, RPX Buys Apple-Backed Rockstar Patents for $900 Million, 
REUTERS, Dec. 23, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/23/us-rpx-rockstar-ip-
idUSKBN0K11AI20141223; Kurt Eichenwald, The Great Smartphone War, VANITY FAI (May 31, 
2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war; 
Brent Kendall & Ashby Jones, Supreme Court Sides With Teva in Patent Case; High Court Reverses 
Ruling That Invalidated Patent on Multiple-Sclerosis Drug, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Jan. 20, 2015, 7:38 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-sides-with-teva-in-patent-case-on-copaxone-14217 
67907. 
 2. Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 25, 57 (1982). See 
also Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Disuniformity, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2007, 2008–09 (2014) 
(discussing the creation of the Federal Circuit by Congress); Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 577–80 (2003) (analyzing the 
purposes of the Act to create the Federal Circuit). 
 3. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (The Federal Circuit “will provide nationwide uniformity in 
patent law” and “make the rules applied in patent litigation more predictable”; such uniformity will 
“eliminate the expensive, time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in 
the field.”). 
 4. See Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1190 (1996) (explaining legislative history of the creation of the Federal Circuit); 
David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 675 (2013) (stating that Congress created 
the Federal Circuit to curb forum shopping). 
 5. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Filings of Patent Infringement Appeals from the 
U.S. District Courts, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Caseload%20Patent% 
20Infringement%20%282006-2015%29.pdf; The First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 100 F.R.D. 499, 501 (1983). 
 6. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 
453–54 (2010) (discussing patent proliferation). 
 7. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 – 2014, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). 
 8. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). On 
September 16, 2011, the President signed into law the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act. Id.; see also 
President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic 
Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs, OFFICE OF THE PRESS 
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innovation and job creation purposes, ironically obtained the 
nickname of “Patent Lawyers’ Full Employment Act.”9 That means 
as the numbers of patent applications and patent grants increase, so 
follow the filings for patent litigation in district courts across the 
nation and subsequent appeals to the Federal Circuit.10 All 
indications demonstrate a sure bet that the Federal Circuit will 
continue to be “the Almighty”11 and “the envy of the system.”12 
Perhaps, the Federal Circuit desires more than enthroning on the 
apex of the system, though. The Federal Circuit has previously 
overreached in areas that it should not and must not.13 For example, 
the Federal Circuit’s overreach into areas of state law, from sales of 
intellectual property assets to secured transactions with patents as 
collateral, has drawn much scrutiny and criticism from scholars and 
judges.14 The Federal Circuit’s expansion has prompted a new patent 
jurisdictional battle emboldened by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gunn v. Minton15—finding no Federal Circuit jurisdiction over state 
                                                                                                                 
SECRETARY, Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-
signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim. 
 9. Skip Kaltenheuser, From the USA: Not So Intellectual Property, INT’L BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=557b2afa-ab58-4bdf-93b0-b956274d2f95 (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2016) (criticizing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was not for jobs creation in 
general, but for the lawyers). 
 10. Ron Katznelson, The America Invents Act at Work – The Major Cause for the Recent Rise in 
Patent Litigation, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/15/aia-the-
major-cause-for-rise-in-patent-litigation/id=39118/ (investigating and observing that the AIA “appears 
to be the dominant cause of the recent major uptick in patent lawsuits”). 
 11. Maggie Tamburro, The ‘Almighty’ Federal Circuit Evolving? Patent Policy & Jurisprudence, 
BULLSEYE (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.ims-expertservices.com/bullseye/january-2013/the-almighty-
federal-circuit-evolving-patent-policy-jurisprudence/. 
 12. Edward Reines, In Defense of the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, PATENTDOCS 
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/10/in-defense-of-the-federal-circuit-a-response-to-
judge-wood.html (“In many ways, the Federal Circuit’s patent docket has become the envy of the 
system.”). 
 13. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, In the Name of Patent Stewardship: The Federal Circuit’s 
Overreach Into Commercial Law, 67 FLA. L. REV. 127 (2015). 
 14. See id.; Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (critiquing the Federal 
Circuit’s overreach in states’ important areas); Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 652–53 (Tex. 2011) 
(Guzman, J., dissenting) (observing the Federal Circuit’s unjustifiable broad reach into area of state 
law); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 29–30 (2014) (explaining the 
roots of the Federal Circuit’s expansive view on its jurisdiction over state claims involving patents). 
 15. See generally Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (limiting the scope of “arising under” 
jurisdiction for patent cases by holding the state claim of legal malpractice in patent cases do not arise 
under patent law and state courts have jurisdiction). The Gunn decision overturns the Federal Circuit’s 
precedents in patent legal malpractice in Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & 
4
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claims of legal malpractice in patent cases—and being waged by the 
Eleventh and Seventh Circuits.16 
The Eleventh Circuit could not sit idly by watching the Federal 
Circuit hear all cases related to patents.17 The Eleventh Circuit 
decided to strike back.18 In a case of first impression, the Eleventh 
Circuit embarked on a patent claim construction and infringement 
analysis under literal infringement and the doctrine of equivalents.19 
Conducting de novo review of the district court’s claim construction, 
the Eleventh Circuit allowed general dictionaries, such as Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary and Oxford English Dictionary, to 
be the primary sources for constructing ordinary meanings of claim 
terms.20 The Eleventh Circuit’s standard for claim construction is in 
direct conflict with the Federal Circuit’s standard, paving the way for 
forum shopping.21 
While the Eleventh Circuit is quietly grabbing jurisdiction to 
justify its new experiment in patent claim construction and 
infringement analysis, the Seventh Circuit—through Chief Judge 
Diane P. Wood—has employed a different approach.22 Chief Judge 
Wood of the Seventh Circuit grabbed the public’s attention by 
vocalizing policy reasons in support of a quest to end the Federal 
Circuit’s exclusive patent jurisdiction.23 The Chief Judge announced 
that the Seventh Circuit is ready and able to handle patent issues.24 
                                                                                                                 
Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 
F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Id. 
 16. See infra Parts I–III. 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. Id. 
 19. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs, Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 846–48 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 20. Id. at 847–48; see also infra Part I. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive 
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 6–10 (2013). 
 24. Id. at 6–7. The Chief Judge remarked about the Seventh Circuit’s capability and expertise in 
complex cases: 
So why we should treat patent law differently is a puzzle. 
 If the answer is simply that patent appeals are much more difficult 
than any other type of case that comes before the courts, there are two 
responses. . . . [T]he regional courts of appeals routinely deal with all manner of 
difficult, technically complex subjects. If there are doubters among you, I would 
direct you to the Seventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Bernstein v. Bankert, in 
5
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What could be some possible explanations for the Eleventh Circuit 
seizing jurisdiction in patent cases and the Seventh Circuit 
demanding for a share of patent cases? Why do they desire and seek 
to hear patent cases? Do they have judicial wisdom to offer, or are 
they envious of the Federal Circuit’s rising prominence? Are there 
some merits to the circuits’ actions that other regional circuits may 
soon adopt? This Article explores possible answers to these 
questions. 
Part I of this Article explains the genesis of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
jurisdiction grabbing in a case where patent claim construction and 
infringement analysis are at the heart of the plaintiff’s action against 
the defendant.25 This Part also carefully presents how the district 
court constructed claim terms and how the Eleventh Circuit 
conducted the de novo review of the claim construction and 
infringement analysis.26 Part II offers a critique of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision.27 There are three sections in this Part of the 
Article. The first section dissects how the decision displays both an 
incompetence in, and ignorance of, patent law, particularly complex 
rules of claim construction governing intrinsic and extrinsic evidence 
and policy reasons for procedures and sources of interpretation.28 The 
second section focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit’s experiment 
with patent claim construction is in direct conflict with sister circuits’ 
precedents, notably the Seventh and Fifth Circuits in cases with 
similar facts.29 Prior cases establish that both the Seventh and Fifth 
Circuits routinely declined jurisdiction in similar patent cases under 
the “well-pleaded complaint” doctrine.30 The last section explains 
how the Eleventh Circuit’s seizure of jurisdiction shows a disregard 
                                                                                                                 
which we clarify (in over seventy-six pages) what events trigger the availability 
of a § 113 contribution claim under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (or CERCLA), and when the party must instead 
resort to a § 107 claim for cost recovery. 
Id. 
 25. See infra Part I. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. See infra Part II.A. 
 29. See infra Part II.B. 
 30. Id. 
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for the Supreme Court’s “age-old rule”31 that a court extending its 
jurisdiction “where none exists has always worked injustice in 
particular cases.”32 
Part III follows by focusing on the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
action.33 Part III identifies the Seventh Circuit’s response vis-à-vis 
Chief Judge Wood’s keynote remarks to end the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive patent jurisdiction in light of its own precedents in similar 
cases.34 Part IV explains the circuits’ responses in two sections.35 The 
first section frames the possible explanation of their responses as 
“judicial wisdom or patent envy” in the context of what patents have 
become in today’s economy.36 Patents are undeniably important, 
prevalent, and omnipresent today.37 The second section focuses on 
the rise of the “Almighty” Federal Circuit and examines whether 
judicial wisdom or patent envy may be a plausible answer.38 
Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit has already injected uncertainty in 
patent law for claim construction, and the Seventh Circuit has 
demanded a share of patent appeal cases.39 If other regional circuits 
follow suit—either by demanding or seizing jurisdiction to engage in 
claim construction—the end of patent law uniformity and the 
beginning of forum shopping will soon arrive.40 
Facing the reality explained in Part IV, this Article suggests to 
regional circuit courts that there are more legitimate grounds for 
asserting appellate jurisdiction in cases involving patents.41 For 
example, as explained in Part V of this Article, in cases where the 
patent issues are non-substantial and where state interests are 
stronger than federal interests in resolving state claims, federalism 
principles dictate that state courts have jurisdiction over those 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988). 
 32. Id.; see also infra Part II.C. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra Part IV. 
 36. See infra Part IV.A. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See infra Part IV.B. 
 39. See infra Part III. 
 40. See infra Part IV.B. 
 41. See infra Part V. 
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cases.42 That means if the cases are in federal courts due to diversity 
and supplemental jurisdiction, regional circuits will have jurisdiction 
on appeals and can decide the patent issues related to the state law 
claims.43 Additionally, in cases where the patent claims are non-
compulsory counterclaims, regional circuit courts can also have 
jurisdiction.44 
Having legitimate grounds to hear cases involving patent issues 
comes with a responsibility that regional circuits must address.45 The 
body of substantive patent law has grown in the last three decades 
without regional circuit involvement.46 They cannot simply disregard 
this growth under the banner of judicial wisdom. Patent litigation has 
already become expensive.47 Uncertainty and forum shopping will 
fuel the cost of patent litigation, and all involved will suffer.48 That 
does not mean regional circuit courts should shy away from cases 
where patents are involved. As this Article concludes, sharing 
judicial labor is a task of delicate balance that all circuit courts must 
treasure in the interest of justice.49 
I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: GRABBING JURISDICTION  
After years of presiding over a vast number of cases and enjoying 
a larger docket of cases than its regional sister circuits, the Eleventh 
Circuit has decided to extend its appellate jurisdiction.50 It ventured 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See infra Part V.B. 
 43. See infra Part V.C. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 25, 57 (1982). 
 47. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981). 
 48. See supra notes 3–4. 
 49. See infra Conclusion. 
 50. See 2014 U.S. Courts of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The Eleventh 
Circuit enjoys a large caseload compared to most other regional circuits. Id. For example, in 2014 alone, 
the Eleventh Circuit had a docket of 2,019 appellate cases. 2014 Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals 
Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/2014/ (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2016). The Third Circuit, on the other hand, had 1,368 cases in the same period. 2014 Third 
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-
courts/ca3/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The Sixth Circuit had 1,509 cases during 2014. 2014 Sixth 
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-
8
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into the area of substantive patent law by exerting its authority to 
grab jurisdiction and engaging in claim construction and 
infringement analysis under both literal infringement and the doctrine 
of equivalents in a case of first impression.51 
The Eleventh Circuit held per curiam in MDS (Canada) Inc. v. 
Rad Source Technologies, Inc. that it had appellate jurisdiction to 
hear an appeal of a breach of contract claim that would require the 
resolution of a claim of patent infringement in order for the 
complainant to succeed.52 The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to 
construct the patent claim scope and perform patent infringement 
analysis, an unprecedented action unauthorized by either Congress or 
the Supreme Court under the well-pleaded complaint rule.53 
In that case, Rad Source licensed its three patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 
6,212,255 (the ‘255 patent), 6,489,099 (the ‘099 patent), and 
6,614,876 (the ‘876 patent), to MDS for the manufacturing and 
marketing of RS 3000 blood irradiation devices.54 Rad Source later 
produced a new device, RS 3400, as a direct medical upgrade of RS 
3000.55 MDS brought a lawsuit against Rad Source for breach of the 
license agreement by selling RS 3400, which was allegedly 
infringing on the licensed patents.56 To prevail, plaintiff MDS had to 
establish that the RS 3400 devices were within the scope of the 
licensed patents. The district court ruled in favor of Rad Source, and 
MDS appealed.57 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had to decide 
                                                                                                                 
courts/ca6/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The Seventh Circuit had a much smaller docket of 1,250 for 
the same time. 2014 Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, 
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The Eighth 
Circuit had 1,254 cases during 2014. 2014 Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. 
LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The 
Tenth Circuit had 1,235 cases for 2014 and the Federal Circuit 1,266. 2014 Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/2014/ 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2016); see also 2014 Federal Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. 
LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). 
 51. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 837–38, 846 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 52. Id. at 837–38. 
 53. See infra Part II. 
 54. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 838. 
 55. Id. at 840. 
 56. Id. at 840–41. 
 57. Id. 
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whether RS 3400 devices “[e]mbody Claim 6 of the ‘255 [p]atent” in 
order to determine the claim for breach of the license agreement.58 
To reach its decision, the Eleventh Circuit conducted a review of 
the patent claim construction and infringement analysis.59 For claim 
construction, the Eleventh Circuit conducted de novo review of the 
district court’s construction.60 For infringement, The Eleventh Circuit 
employed “clear error” review of the district court’s finding “as to 
whether the claims, as properly construed, read on the accused 
device.”61 
The Eleventh Circuit began its claim construction analysis by 
asserting that the “words of a claim are generally given their ordinary 
and customary meaning.”62 The Eleventh Circuit continued by 
quoting the Federal Circuit’s dicta on claim construction: “In some 
cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a 
person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, 
and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the 
application of widely accepted meaning of commonly understood 
words.”63 With such a frame of reference on claim construction and 
nothing more, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded in its review of the 
district court’s construction of five claim terms: “(1) beam, (2) source 
of X-ray radiation, (3) thickness dimension, (4) rotating, and (5) 
vertical area” of Claim 6 of the ‘255 patent.64 
As to the first two claim terms, “beam” and “source of X-ray 
radiation,” the Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court’s 
interpretation of “beam” included a “cone of irradiation, but not a 
field of irradiation,” and the district court’s interpretation of “source 
of X-ray radiation” meant a “directional source, instead of a 
nondirectional source.”65 The district court relied on experts’ 
testimony for its construction of “source of X-ray radiation” and the 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 846. 
 59. Id. 
 60. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 846. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 846 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 63. Id. at 846 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). 
 64. Id. at 847. 
 65. Id. 
10
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Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of “beam” for its construction 
of the claim term.66 The Eleventh Circuit also mentioned that the 
description of the invention and one of the figures in the 
specifications make references to a “beam” that would suggest a 
“directional, cone-like shape.”67 The Eleventh Circuit summarily 
concluded that the construction for the first two terms was correct.68 
As to the term “rotating,” the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that to 
“rotate a bag to an opposite side, the rotation necessary would be 180 
degrees, as opposed to a continuous 360–degree rotation.”69 The 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s construction of 
“rotating.”70 
With respect to the term “vertical area,” the Eleventh Circuit stated 
that the district court’s construction means “that the bag must be 
oriented vertically, as opposed to horizontally” and that the district 
court relied on Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary for the 
definition of “vertical” as “perpendicular to the plane of the horizon 
or to a primary axis.”71 Without further discussion, the Eleventh 
                                                                                                                 
 66. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 847. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit noted what the district court 
did at trial: 
Using the analogy relied on by the experts at trial, the district court determined 
that the beam of X-ray mentioned in Claim 6 is more like the cone-shaped beam 
of light from a flashlight than the field of light emitted by a fluorescent tube light. 
Nordion’s expert, Stephen Szeglin, testified that the terms in Claim 6 could 
encompass both a cone and a field of irradiation because X-ray beams are 
produced omni-directionally. Dr. Roberto Uribe, the expert who appeared on 
behalf of Rad Source, testified that a ‘beam’ of X-ray would refer to radiation 
traveling in a well-defined direction. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a 
‘beam’ as both a ‘[a] ray, or “bundle” of parallel rays, of light emitted from the 
sun or other luminous body; out-streaming radiance’ and as ‘[a] directed flow of 
radiation or particles.’ 
Id. (quoting Beam, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2015), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
16505). 
 67. Id. at 847 (“For example, the description of the invention explains that ‘the output port of each of 
the X-ray tubes . . . should preferably have a diameter to provide a 45 degree beam such that the beam 
has at least a diameter of 15.5 cm at 23 cm distant from the tube.’ And Figure 4, which is a sketch of an 
embodiment of the single-source system, indicates a cone-like beam of X-rays.”). 
 68. Id. at 847–48. 
 69. Id. at 847. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 848. 
11
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Circuit agreed with the district court’s construction with reliance 
primarily on the general dictionary.72 
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did 
not err in its claim construction.73 In the next step of infringement 
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit simply concluded that there is no literal 
infringement for the following reason: 
The RS 3400 uses a continuously rotating cylindrical 
container to hold the blood bag, so the process of 
irradiation does not occur in two steps, with a 180–degree 
rotation in between. And the blood bag in the RS 3400 is 
oriented horizontally from the X-ray source. Thus the RS 
3400 cannot fall within the literal terms of the claim.74 
Furthermore, for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, 
the Eleventh Circuit readily affirmed the district court’s finding of no 
infringement: 
The irradiator described in Claim 6 holds the blood bag at a 
fixed distance from the X-ray source, and the blood bag is 
irradiated from one side, then turned and irradiated from 
the opposite side. By contrast, the blood bag in the RS 3400 
is continuously rotated around the X-ray source in an 
elliptical pattern, like the orbit of a planet around the Sun.75 
With its decision on claim construction, literal infringement and 
doctrine of equivalents infringement, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that 
RS 3400 does not embody in whole or in part the ‘255 patent, and, 
                                                                                                                 
 72. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 848. However, with respect to the last claim term, “thickness 
dimension,” the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s construction of the term as four 
centimeters or less. Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that because Claim 4 defines the thickness of a bag to 
be four centimeters and Claim 6 does not, the term “thickness” in Claim 6 is interpreted as the 
“narrower side of the rectangular bag” even though the description of the invention states that the 
thickness of the bags is at four centimeters. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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therefore, Rad Source did not breach the patent license agreement 
with MDS.76 Overall, the Eleventh Circuit did not examine most of 
the claim terms in context of the claim language itself, the 
specification of the patent, or the prosecution history.77 
II. CRITIQUE OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S PATENT DECISION 
A. Incompetence in and Ignorance of Patent Law 
MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. illustrates 
the problem of a regional circuit court’s overreach into the Federal 
Circuit’s substantive patent law and exclusive patent jurisdiction. 
Because the Federal Circuit has already developed a copious body of 
substantial patent law since its inception on October 1, 1982,78 
regional circuit courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have little or 
no expertise in the substantive patent law area.79 By its own 
admission, the Eleventh Circuit was treading into uncharted territory 
of patent claim construction and infringement analysis.80 The 
overreach occurred through its aggressive exertion of patent 
jurisdiction.81 
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the reality that in the 
last thirty years patent claim construction has become highly 
structured and complex,82 and a new set of rules for claim 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 847–48. 
 78. Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). 
 79. See generally Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(addressing “on sale” bar and patent invalidity). The last time that the Eleventh Circuit had an 
opportunity to address patent infringement was July 9, 1982, three months before the Federal Circuit 
was created. Id. 
 80. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 837–38 (“This appeal presents a jurisdictional issue of first 
impression in our Court: whether the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a 
breach of contract claim that would require the resolution of a claim of patent infringement for the 
complainant to succeed.”). 
 81. Id. at 841 (“[W]e conclude that the district court had diversity jurisdiction and supplemental 
jurisdiction, but not patent jurisdiction[.] [W]e have jurisdiction over this appeal.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 82. See generally Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim 
Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 714–15 
(2010) (observing that “the substantive standards and process for delineating patent claim terms have 
undergone significant evolution” and the “bewildering arrays of cases and rules” can “overwhelm 
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construction has been established.83 For example, with respect to 
construction of ordinary claim terms, the Federal Circuit 
categorically rejected heavy reliance on dictionary meanings.84 The 
Federal Circuit requires that proper construction of ordinary claim 
terms must first focus on intrinsic evidence: the claim language, the 
                                                                                                                 
litigants, counsel, law clerks, and jurists”). The authors attribute the complexity of claim constructions 
to “the inherent difficulties of using language to define the boundaries of abstract and intangible rights. 
These challenges grew with the rise of information technologies. The boundaries of patent claims to 
software and business methods have proven particularly ambiguous.” Id. at 716. 
 83. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 378 (1996). The seminal decision in 
patent claim construction is Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., which directed district courts to 
conduct patent claim construction hearings to interpret patent claims as a matter “exclusively within the 
province of the court” as the first step in determining patent infringement. Id. at 372. A Markman 
hearing can be a lengthy, full-blown trial. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979–80 
(Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The Markman decision sets forth important rules, including 
that “[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part,” and the “written 
description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the purpose and 
function of claims.” Id. at 979–80. In addition to the procedure provided under Markman, the Federal 
Circuit in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. imposed a more rigorous framework for claim 
construction: 
 First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and 
nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention. . . . [S]econd, it is 
always necessary to review the specification to determine whether the inventor 
has used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary 
meaning. . . . Third, the court may also consider the prosecution history of the 
patent, if in evidence. . . . In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence 
alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, 
it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence. 
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Menell, supra 
note 82, at 721–24 (discussing intrinsic evidence in construction of claim terms). Moreover, the Federal 
Circuit has frequently overturned district courts’ claim constructions. See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 
1090 (2001) (stating that the Federal Circuit’s overturn rate for district court claim constructions was 
almost 40% of cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2001) (reporting overturn rate 33% of district courts cases). The 
reversal rate, however, has decreased significantly due to the Federal Circuit’s monumental decision in 
Phillips. See generally J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, 
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) 
(reporting the decrease in Federal Circuit’s reversal rate on claim constructions in recent years). 
 84. See, e.g., Byrne v. Black & Decker Corp., 235 Fed. App’x 741, 745 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reversing 
the district court for relying too much on extrinsic evidence). In fact, district courts following proper 
claim constructions enjoy a lower reversal rate. See, e.g., Tony Zeuli & Rachel Clark Hughey, Avoiding 
Patent Claim Construction Errors After Phillips, FED. LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 50, 51 (“Of 64 
published Federal Circuit claim construction decisions applying the Phillips decision since mid-2007, 
the Federal Circuit has affirmed the district court’s claim construction in its entirety in 39 decisions. 
That means that, in the sample considered for this review, the court affirmed more than 60 percent of the 
claim construction cases—a vast improvement over the 50 percent or higher rate of decisions that were 
reversed prior to [2005].”). 
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specification, and the patent prosecution history.85 Extrinsic 
evidence, such as dictionary meanings and expert testimony, should 
not be the primary source for claim construction.86 
Specifically, in the en banc decision Phillips v. AWH Corp., the 
Federal Circuit comprehensively reviewed decisional law history and 
policy for claim construction87 dated as far back as 1876 with the 
Supreme Court’s mandate that the claims themselves are of “primary 
importance” in ascertaining precisely the meaning of claim terms for 
knowing what is patented.88 The requirement of reliance on the 
claims themselves for claim construction rests on the strong policy 
that it is “unjust to the public” and “an evasion of the law” to 
construe claim terms “in a manner different from the plain import of 
its terms.”89 In addition to reliance on claim language for ordinary 
meaning of claim terms,90 the Phillips court discussed the use of 
other intrinsic evidence, such as the specifications and the 
prosecution history in claim construction.91 For instance, in 
construing the ordinary meaning of a claim term, as the Phillips court 
restated, claim construction cannot be done in “a vacuum” but must 
look “at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written 
description and the prosecution history.”92 The rationale for looking 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining intrinsic and 
extrinsic evidence, emphasizing the importance of intrinsic evidence and cautioning against the use of 
extrinsic evidence). 
 86. See, e.g., Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1348–56 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(Federal Circuit’s de novo review of constructing the claim term “aesthetically pleasing” by (1) first 
looking at the term in context of the claim, (2) if the claim language “lacks sufficient clarity to ascertain 
the scope of the claims,” analyzing the term in the specification, and (3) analyzing the prosecution 
history to determine whether it provides any reasonable construction of the term). The Datamize court 
consulted the extrinsic evidence in the record of expert testimonies and disregarded them. Id. at 1353–
54. 
 87. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–19. 
 88. Id. at 1312 (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876)). See also Cont’l Paper Bag 
Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908) (“[T]he claims measure the invention.”); Aro Mfg. 
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961) (“[T]he claims made in the patent 
are the sole measure of the grant.”). 
 89. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886). 
 90. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the 
meaning of particular claim terms.”); ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (“[T]he context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered in determining the 
ordinary and customary meaning of those terms.”). 
 91. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14. 
 92. Id. at 1313 (quoting Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
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at the ordinary meaning of a claim term in the context of the patent, 
including specification or written description and the prosecution 
history, is that the intrinsic record provides the court with the 
“technological and temporal context” to ascertain the meaning of the 
claim term in accordance with the inventor or “one of ordinary skill 
in the art at the time of the invention.”93 
Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the canon of claim 
construction for ordinary meaning of claim terms.94 The Eleventh 
Circuit permitted the district court to rely primarily on extrinsic 
evidence: experts’ testimonies and two general dictionaries, Oxford 
and Merriam-Webster, to serve as the principal source for claim 
construction.95 Worse, the Eleventh Circuit cited the Phillips decision 
for support.96 If the Eleventh Circuit had read Phillips a few 
paragraphs further and with greater care, it would have discovered 
that Phillips rejected the reliance on experts’ testimony and general 
dictionaries as the primary source for ascertaining ordinary meaning 
of claim terms.97 The Phillips court stated that extrinsic evidence is 
“less reliable,” “quite misleading,” and “suffer[s] from bias” because 
the evidence is not part of the patent and its prosecution history; it is 
created at the time of litigation for purpose of litigation; it is offered 
by a hypothetical person with skills in the art; and it may not reflect 
the understanding of a skilled person in the field of the patent.98 
Moreover, the Phillips court condemned primary reliance on 
extrinsic evidence for construing the ordinary meaning of claim 
terms because such reliance derogates the undisputable public record 
of the patent and undermines “the public notice function of 
patents.”99 In summary, the Phillips court warned that even though 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (quoting V–Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Grp. SpA, 401 F.3d 1307, 
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). See also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1351 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (proper definition is the “definition that 
one of ordinary skill in the art could ascertain from the intrinsic evidence in the record”). 
 94. See supra Part I. 
 95. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs, Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 847–48 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 96. Id. at 846. 
 97. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19. 
 98. Id. at 1318. 
 99. See id. at 1319. 
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extrinsic evidence may be useful, it is “unlikely to result in a reliable 
interpretation of patent claim scope . . . .”100 
Moreover, the Phillips court ruled strongly against reliance on 
general dictionaries in claim construction because general 
dictionaries “strive to collect all uses of particular words, from the 
common to the obscure,” and offer “multiple dictionary definitions 
for a term” that will “extend beyond the ‘construction of the patent 
[that] is confirmed by the avowed understanding of the patentee, 
expressed by him, or on his behalf, when his application for the 
original patent was pending.’”101 Federal Circuit cases permit courts 
to rely on technical dictionaries to construe claim terms, but only if 
the technical dictionary definition “does not contradict any definition 
found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”102 
Illustratively, applying the precedent set forth in Phillips, the 
Federal Circuit in Byrne v. Black & Decker Corp. rejected the district 
court’s claim construction of the term “surface” because it gave too 
much weight to the dictionary definition rather than to intrinsic 
evidence.103 In that case, the district court consulted Webster’s II New 
College Dictionary and defined “surface” as “the exterior face of an 
object” or “a material layer constituting such an exterior face.”104 The 
district court also “relied on the Random House College 
Dictionary . . . to further define ‘surface’ to mean ‘the outer face, 
outside, or exterior boundary of a thing’ or ‘part or all of the 
boundary of a solid.’”105 On appeal, the Federal Circuit demonstrated 
how the term “surface” should have been properly construed under 
Phillips.106 The Federal Circuit explained that the “proper claim 
construction based on the teachings in Phillips begins with the claim 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1321–22 (quoting Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227 (1880)). 
 102. Id. at 1322–23; see also Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(noting the term “module” has technical dictionary meanings in accordance with IBM Dictionary of 
Computing, Alan Freedman’s The Computer Glossary, and John Daintith & Edmund Wring, Dictionary 
of Computing). 
 103. Byrne v. Black & Decker Corp., 235 F. App’x 741, 745 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 104. Id. at 744. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 745. 
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language.”107 The Federal Circuit carefully examined how the term 
“surface” appears in the context of the claim language itself.108 Next, 
the Federal Circuit looked to the specification of the patent and 
identified where in the specification the meaning of the term 
“surface” is supported.109 Last, the Federal Circuit focused on 
prosecution history and found how certain cited references must be 
overcome during prosecution that lent support to the construction of 
the term “surface” to be “flat,” “continuous,” “not de minimis,” 
“two-dimensional,” and one “that is not narrow but has a width less 
than the feed increment of [a] trimmer head and is itself generally 
planar.”110 
Because the district court did not engage in proper claim 
construction and relied too much on general dictionaries, the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court erred in its claim construction of 
the ordinary claim term “surface” under Phillips.111 Phillips’ 
framework of claim construction is profound. Indeed, the structured 
claim construction teachings propounded by Phillips in 2005 have 
brought a new era of certainty.112 Since Phillips, the Federal Circuit’s 
reversal rate of district courts’ claim constructions has dropped from 
44% in 2004 to 16.5% in 2009.113 
The Eleventh Circuit charted its own path for claim construction 
despite established patent law, the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion 
in Phillips, and claim constructions post-Phillips to guide it. The 
Eleventh Circuit authorized claim construction with primary reliance 
on expert testimony and general dictionaries to ascertain the ordinary 
meaning of claim terms.114 The Eleventh Circuit’s conduct can only 
be viewed as either a complete ignorance of patent law or a deliberate 
contradiction of the Federal Circuit’s precedent established in 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Byrne, 235 F. App’x at 745. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 745–46. 
 112. Anderson & Menell, supra note 83, at 5–6 (discussing the new data on the Federal Circuit’s 
reversal rate on claim constructions since Phillips). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad 
Source Techs, Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 847–48 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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Phillips and its progeny on claim construction for ordinary claim 
terms. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit’s experiment in a case of 
first impression has injected uncertainty in claim construction cases. 
Litigants can now engage in forum shopping to select an appellate 
forum with claim construction rules that may influence infringement 
analysis results.115 Litigants now know that in the Eleventh Circuit 
they can heavily rely on general dictionaries, expert testimony, and 
other extrinsic evidence while Phillips forbids them from so doing in 
the Federal Circuit. 
B. Openly Contradicting Other Sister Circuits’ Precedents 
The Eleventh Circuit’s experiment with patent claim construction 
in MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. also conflicts 
with sister circuits’ precedents on exclusive patent appeal 
jurisdiction. Notably, the decision openly contradicts the Seventh and 
Fifth Circuit’s precedents.116 
For instance, in U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, the Seventh Circuit 
declined patent jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Federal 
Circuit.117 Factually, U.S. Valves is similar to MDS. In U.S. Valves, 
plaintiff U.S. Valves claimed that defendant Dray sold valves in 
violation of the parties’ patent license agreement.118 Dray invented an 
internal piston valve, obtained a patent for the invention, and licensed 
the patent to U.S. Valves in exchange for royalty payments.119 Over 
time, however, the relationship between the parties deteriorated, and 
Dray terminated the patent license agreement.120 Subsequently, Dray 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Claim construction “plays a critical role in nearly every patent case. It is central to the evaluation 
of infringement and validity, and can affect or determine the outcome of other significant issues such as 
unenforceability, enablement, and remedies.” Menell et al., supra note 82, at 714. 
 116. See generally U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 1999); Scherbatskoy v. 
Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 117. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 815; see also Kennedy v. Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 964 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(transferring the case involving ownership of new patents to the Federal Circuit under the well-pleaded-
complaint rules and answering in the affirmative the issue: “May a question ‘arise under’ the patent 
laws, thus creating federal jurisdiction in the district court, but not ‘arise under’ the patent laws for 
purposes of appellate jurisdiction?”). 
 118. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 812. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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began producing and selling the internal piston valve and another 
type of valve called the sliding ring valve; both valves served the 
same functions.121 Dray also filed a patent application for the sliding 
ring valve.122 Upon learning about Dray’s conduct, U.S. Valves 
asserted that the sliding ring valve was the equivalent of the internal 
piston valve and, therefore, was covered by the parties’ exclusive 
patent license agreement.123 Alleging a breach of contract, U.S. 
Valves claimed that the licensed patents covered both types of Dray’s 
valves.124 The district court found breach of contract, issued a 
permanent injunction, and awarded damages against Dray.125 On 
appeal in the Seventh Circuit based on diversity jurisdiction, Dray 
requested that the Seventh Circuit transfer the case to the Federal 
Circuit because U.S. Valves’ claim for breach of contract necessarily 
would include patent law as an essential element of the claim.126 
Evaluating whether Dray breached the contract would require a 
determination of whether Dray’s valves infringed the plaintiff’s 
licensed patents.127 In other words, the patent infringement analysis 
was substantial and a necessary element of the plaintiff’s breach of 
contract claim.128 The Seventh Circuit focused on whether the district 
court’s jurisdiction over the complaint rested on diversity jurisdiction 
or patent jurisdiction.129 The Seventh Circuit applied the well-
pleaded complaint doctrine’s test mandated in the Supreme Court’s 
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. decision. There, the 
Court stated: 
[Patent law] jurisdiction extends only to those cases in 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 812. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 814. Dray conceded the breach of contract based on his company had manufactured and 
sold the internal piston valve. Id. at 812. With respect to the sliding ring valve, the parties disputed on 
whether these valves were covered by the patent license agreement for the calculation of damages. Id. at 
812–13. 
 128. Id. at 813. 
 129. Id. 
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which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that 
federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the 
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution 
of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent 
law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded 
claims.130 
The Seventh Circuit noted that U.S. Valves’ claim for breach of 
contract does not state a patent law claim. Thus, the first prong of 
Christianson was not applicable.131 Under the second prong of the 
test, the Seventh Circuit observed that because (1) the license 
agreement between Dray and U.S. Valves granted U.S. Valves the 
“‘exclusive right to manufacture, use, sell, advertise, and distribute’” 
the licensed products covered by the licensed patents and (2) U.S. 
Valves claimed that Dray was selling valves in violation of the 
exclusive license provision, “the only way for U.S. Valves to 
establish this claim [was] for it to show that Dray sold valves 
covered” by the licensed patents.132 Consequently, to establish breach 
of contract, “the court must first examine the patent and determine 
which valves are covered and whether the patent was infringed.”133 
In other words, “patent law [was] a necessary element of U.S. 
Valves’ breach of contract action,” and the Seventh Circuit did not 
have jurisdiction.134 The Federal Circuit had the exclusive 
jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit, therefore, transferred the case to 
the Federal Circuit.135 
Likewise, in Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., the Fifth Circuit 
rendered a similar decision by declining jurisdiction and transferring 
the case to the Federal Circuit.136 In that case, Serge A. Scherbatskoy, 
Sr. obtained patents for processes relating to “measuring while 
                                                                                                                 
 130. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 813. (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 
800, 809 (1988)). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 813–14. 
 133. Id. at 814. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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drilling” or “MWD” technology.137 Scherbatskoy then entered into a 
license agreement with Gearhart-Owen Industries, Inc. for Gearhart’s 
use of the patents.138 Halliburton later acquired Gearhart and engaged 
in a dispute with Scherbatskoy over the rights and obligations under 
the license agreement for the MWD patents.139 The parties negotiated 
a Settlement Agreement and a new Patent License Agreement.140 
Under these agreements, Scherbatskoy granted Halliburton a license 
to use the MWD patents in exchange for royalty payments.141 In 
addition, the Patent License Agreement provided that if Halliburton 
acquired a “New Company” that had offered MWD services prior to 
the date of Halliburton’s acquisition of the company, Halliburton 
would have to pay additional royalties.142 
Thereafter, Halliburton acquired certain assets from Smith 
International Inc., including all of Smith’s MWD technology.143 
Halliburton asserted that its acquisition of Smith’s assets did not 
amount to an acquisition of a “New Company.”144 Accordingly, 
Halliburton refused to pay additional royalties to Scherbatskoy.145 
Scherbatskoy brought suit for breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duty against Halliburton in a Texas state court.146 
Halliburton successfully removed the action to a federal district court 
on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, insisting that 
Scherbatskoy’s complaint invoked patent law, and diversity 
jurisdiction.147 At summary judgment, the district court granted 
Halliburton’s motion that there was no breach of contract.148 
Scherbatskoy appealed to the Fifth Circuit.149 Halliburton moved to 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. at 289. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Scherbatskoy, 125 F.3d at 289. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 290. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Scherbatskoy, 125 F.3d at 290. 
 149. Id. 
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dismiss the appeal or to transfer the appeal to the Federal Circuit in 
the alternative.150 
The Fifth Circuit decided the jurisdiction issue.151 In determining 
whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal, the Fifth Circuit followed 
the Supreme Court’s Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. 
decision and applied the well-pleaded complaint rule to ascertain 
whether Scherbatskoy’s lawsuit arose under the federal patent laws: 
“[whether] the complaint include[d] allegations that federal patent 
law create[d] the cause of action or federal patent law [was] a 
necessary element of the claim.”152 The Fifth Circuit observed that 
resolution of Scherbatskoy’s contract claim “implicates the federal 
patent laws” because Scherbatskoy’s complaint alleged “Halliburton 
breached the contract when it failed to pay additional royalties under 
the Patent License Agreement after acquiring a new company, Smith 
International, which, it is alleged, infringed the Scherbatskoys’ 
patents.”153 Thus, “determining whether Smith International infringed 
the Scherbatskoys’ patents is a necessary element to recovery of 
additional royalties or a finding that Halliburton breached the Patent 
License Agreement. Both issues require the application of the federal 
patent laws.”154 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal and only the Federal Circuit 
would have jurisdiction; the Fifth Circuit then transferred the case.155 
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit also dismissed as “irrelevant” that the 
summary judgment appeal did not explicitly address the patent issue 
for jurisdiction purposes; the exclusive patent jurisdiction for the 
appeal rested with the Federal Circuit. 156 
On the receiving end, the Federal Circuit also engaged in 
jurisdictional analysis before it decided to accept the cases 
transferred from the Seventh Circuit157 and the Fifth Circuit.158 For 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 291 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988)). 
 153. Id. at 291. 
 154. Scherbatskoy, 125 F.3d at 291. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. U.S. Valves v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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example, in determining whether jurisdiction was proper for the 
Federal Circuit to accept the case in Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 
the Federal Circuit also looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., which enunciated 
that patent jurisdiction can only be extended in cases where either the 
federal patent law creates the cause of action or where the plaintiff’s 
claim depends on resolution of a substantial question of patent law.159 
In addition, the Federal Circuit relied on its prior decisions, such as 
Hunter Douglas v. Harmonic Design and Additive Controls v. 
Flowdata, for guidance in deciding U.S. Valves v. Dray.160 The 
Federal Circuit asserted jurisdiction in Hunter Douglas v. Harmonic 
Design because it invoked patent law.161 In that case, the patentee 
and its licensees were accused of committing a state tort of falsehood 
through their assertion that they held exclusive rights in patents even 
though the patents were invalid and unenforceable.162 The state’s 
falsehood claim required the determination of whether the patents 
were indeed invalid and unenforceable.163 Likewise, in Additive 
Controls v. Flowdata, the Federal Circuit asserted jurisdiction over a 
case where Additive claimed that Flowdata made false accusations 
that Additive infringed on Flowdata’s patent in violation of the 
state’s business disparagement law.164 Determining whether 
Flowdata’s statement was false would require a determination of 
non-infringement of the patent at issue.165 
In applying Christianson’s teachings and the Hunter Douglas and 
Additive Controls decisions, the Federal Circuit in U.S. Valves v. 
Dray noted that the present case contained a substantial issue of 
federal patent law under the well-pleaded complaint rule that would 
warrant the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.166 Specifically, the license 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., No. 98-1290, 1999 WL 13377, at *2–4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11, 
1999). 
 159. Id. at *3 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988)). 
 160. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (discussing Hunter Douglas v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (discussing Additive Controls v. Flowdata, 986 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372 (“As in Hunter Douglas and Additive, this case contains a 
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agreement between U.S. Valves and Dray provided U.S. Valves “an 
exclusive right to manufacture, use, sell, advertise, and distribute the 
Licensed Product.”167 To establish that Dray sold valves in violation 
of U.S. Valves’ exclusive rights to such sales, the court found that 
“U.S. Valves must show that Dray sold valves that were covered by 
the licensed patents.”168 This would require the court to interpret and 
construct patent claim terms and then determine whether the valves 
infringed the licensed patents.169 In other words, patent law was 
substantial and a necessary element of U.S. Valves’ breach of 
contract action.170 
In summary, U.S. Valves and Scherbatskoy represent a “case 
within a case” that the state cause of action requires a determination 
of patent infringement, non-infringement, invalidity, or enforceability 
under the well-pleaded rule.171 The patent issue was substantial and 
necessary to ascertaining whether there was a violation of state 
law.172 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have 
established their own precedents in this area, in agreement with the 
Federal Circuit’s case law, and transferred cases to the Federal 
Circuit.173 
The Eleventh Circuit ignored the established precedents and 
openly contradicted the Fifth, Seventh, and Federal Circuits. 
Although the decision in U.S. Valves v. Dray explicitly acknowledges 
that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim required resolution of the 
patent infringement claim where the licensed patents covered the 
defendant’s newly developed products, the Eleventh Circuit 
disregarded precedents and proceeded to engage in the two steps of 
                                                                                                                 
substantial issue of federal patent law.”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(discussing cases deemed as a “case within a case” that would present a substantial patent question for 
jurisdictional purpose). 
 172. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 813–14; Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., No. 98-1290, 1999 WL 
13377, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11, 1999). 
 173. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 1999) (transferring the case to the Federal 
Circuit); Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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patent infringement analysis.174 The Eleventh Circuit engaged in 
patent claim construction and infringement analysis under literal 
infringement and the doctrine of equivalents.175 The Eleventh Circuit 
then concluded that no patent infringement existed and, therefore, no 
breach of the license agreement occurred.176 Clearly, the patent law 
issue was substantial and a necessary element in the contract claim. 
Yet, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that the patent law issue was not 
substantial to the contract claim because its “resolution of this 
question [was] unlikely to control any future cases.”177 Due to “the 
fact-bound nature” of the patent question and “the small likelihood 
that the resolution” of the patent infringement would “impact future 
cases,” the Eleventh Circuit stated that it could not “conclude that the 
issue of patent infringement presented by [the plaintiff] is a 
‘substantial question’ of federal [patent] law.”178 Simply, the 
Eleventh Circuit grabbed appellate jurisdiction when it had no 
authority under the law. The Eleventh Circuit’s conduct and 
justification are directly in conflict with the Seventh, Fifth, and 
Federal Circuits under the well-pleaded complaint doctrine for patent 
cases.179 
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s belief that its claim construction, 
with primary reliance on general dictionaries and expert testimony, 
will not impact future cases ignores the obvious consequences of its 
decision. It destroys uniformity in claim construction, one of the most 
important areas of substantive patent law.180 It also opens the door for 
forum shopping to manipulate outcomes.181 
                                                                                                                 
 174. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Tech., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 846–48 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 842. The Eleventh Circuit further justified its decision that: 
All of the relevant parties are joined in this lawsuit and will be bound by the 
decision regarding the RS 3400. Both the highly specialized nature of patent 
claims and the niche market for blood irradiator devices suggest that the 
resolution of this issue is unlikely to impact any future constructions of claims. 
Id. 
 178. Id. at 843. 
 179. Compare id., with Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997), and 
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 180. See supra notes 114–15. 
 181. Id. 
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C. Disregard for the Supreme Court’s Teaching 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in MDS (Canada), Inc. v. Rad 
Source Technologies, Inc. also disregarded the Supreme Court’s 
mandate in Christianson.182 The Supreme Court, in addition to 
instructing courts on the well-pleaded complaint rule, mandated that 
courts follow the “age-old” rule—”that a court may not in any case, 
even in the interest of justice, extend its jurisdiction where none 
exists”—because not following this rule “has always worked 
injustice in particular cases.”183 The Eleventh Circuit ignored 
Christianson with regard to both the well-pleaded complaint rule and 
the mandate. 
In Christianson, plaintiff Colt brought a state claim of trade secret 
misappropriation against its former employee, Christianson, and 
others.184 The defendants claimed that (1) Colt’s patents were invalid 
for failure to disclose enablement and best mode information and that 
(2) the “trade secrets” that the patents should have disclosed lost any 
state protection because Colt had benefits from owning invalid 
patents.185 Consequently, the defendants asserted they did not 
misappropriate Colt’s trade secrets because the “trade secrets” had no 
protection.186 The Federal Circuit initially declined to exercise 
jurisdiction because the patent issue was not a substantial and 
necessary element of plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation 
claim.187 The Seventh Circuit also declined to exercise jurisdiction.188 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that no patent 
jurisdiction existed because the case did not arise under patent law 
due to the plaintiff’s complaint never suggesting patents and the 
defendant’s defense raising a theory of invalidity.189 In summary, the 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Compare MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 841, with Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 
486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988), and Christianson, 798 F.2d at 1052. 
 183. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818. 
 184. Id. at 804–06. 
 185. Id. at 806. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1549–60 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(discussing the numerous times retransferring between the Federal Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, as 
neither circuit believed that it had jurisdiction). 
 188. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1052 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 189. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborer’s 
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Supreme Court established that patent law jurisdiction extends only 
to cases where (1) federal patent law provides a cause of action or (2) 
the plaintiff’s right to relief “necessarily depends on resolution of a 
substantial question of federal patent law.”190 The Supreme Court 
held that the plaintiff’s trade secrets violation claim did not raise a 
substantial question of patent law or that the patent was a necessary 
element of the plaintiff’s claim.191 
Applying the rule and rationale mandated by Christianson, the 
Federal Circuit should have exclusive jurisdiction over MDS 
(Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. because the 
plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract depends on the resolution of 
whether the defendant’s products are covered under the patents stated 
in the contract.192 The patent question was substantial and necessary 
in resolving the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against the 
defendants for manufacturing devices covered by the licensed 
patents. The Eleventh Circuit ignored precedents and grabbed 
jurisdiction where it did not have it, contrary to decisions rendered by 
the Seventh and Fifth Circuits.193 In so doing, it violated the age-old 
rule mandated by Christianson that regional circuit courts must 
refrain from exerting jurisdiction when jurisdiction does not exist, to 
avoid “working injustice” in the case.194 The injustice in MDS 
includes fracturing the structured claim construction rules and 
inviting forum shopping for claim construction rules favorable to 
influence litigation outcomes. 
                                                                                                                 
Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (“[W]hether a claim ‘arises under’ patent law ‘must be 
determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or 
declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the 
defendant may interpose’ . . . . Thus, a case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for that reason 
alone, ‘arise under’ patent law, ‘even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if 
both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.”). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 810. 
 192. See infra Part IV. In recent years, the Supreme Court has addressed jurisdiction issue in legal 
malpractice in patent cases. Id. In these types of cases, the patent issue is not substantial because it is 
hypothetical in nature. Id. 
 193. See supra Part I. 
 194. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818. 
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D. Violating a Congressional Act 
By asserting appellate jurisdiction over a case where patent law is 
a substantial question of the plaintiff’s claim, the Eleventh Circuit 
also violated Congress’s intent in vesting the Federal Circuit with 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to hear patent cases in whole or in 
part under 28 U.S.C. § 1338195 that “arise under” patent law.196 
Congress created the Federal Circuit under the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982.197 As stated in the legislative document, 
Congress created the Federal Circuit to end forum shopping, the 
widespread lack of uniformity, and the uncertainty of legal doctrine 
in patent law.198 The Eleventh Circuit’s claim construction to 
ascertain the ordinary meaning of claim terms with primary reliance 
on expert testimony and two general dictionaries, Oxford and 
Merriam-Webster, directly contradicted the Federal Circuit’s 
precedents on claim construction for ordinary meaning of claim 
terms.199 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision injects uncertainty, causes 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Congress set forth the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) to be 
read jointly with Section 1338: 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction—(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court . . . if the 
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1346 of [28 
U.S.C.], except that jurisdiction of an appeal in a case brought in a district court 
under section 1346(a)(1), 1346(b), 1346(e), or 1346(f) of this title, or under 
section 1346(a)(2) when the claim is founded upon an Act of Congress or a 
regulation of an executive department providing for internal revenue shall be 
governed by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title. 
28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act subsequently changed the 
jurisdictional provisions. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 196. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 41 (1981) (stating that the cases fall within the Federal 
Circuit’s exclusive patent jurisdiction “in the same sense that cases are said to ‘arise under’ federal law 
for purposes of federal question jurisdiction”). In the recent overhaul of patent law, Congress has 
expanded the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to cover compulsory counterclaims. See also 28 
U.S.C. § 1295 (2012); discussion infra Part IV. 
 197. See generally Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in 
a Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 529 (2004) 
(providing a brief history of the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
 198. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981) (stating that one Congress’s objectives when creating the 
Federal Circuit was “to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that 
exist[ed] in the administration of patent law,” and that such uniformity will “eliminate the expensive, 
time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in the field”); see also 
Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 259–60 (2003) (tracing the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
 199. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Tech., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 846–48 (11th Cir. 2013). 
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the lack of uniformity as to the rules of claim construction, and opens 
the door for forum shopping. Simply, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
violates a congressional act and Congress’s intent behind that act, 
regardless of whether it legitimately had appellate jurisdiction. 
III. NEW RESPONSES FROM THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
While the Eleventh Circuit grabbed patent jurisdiction without 
authority, the Seventh Circuit grabbed the public’s attention through 
its Chief Judge’s speech, “Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s 
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?”200 Whether the speech was 
“elegant,”201 “colorful,”202 or an “unconventional” blending of the 
Dixie Chicks, Robin Thicke and Burt Bacharach,203 the Chief Judge 
for the Seventh Circuit emphatically wants to end the Federal 
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction in patent cases. The Chief Judge 
asserted that exclusive jurisdiction in the name of legal uniformity is 
harmful to the patent system because it lacks opportunities for 
percolation before it reaches the Supreme Court,204 and it lacks 
multiple judicial perspectives from sister circuits.205 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23. 
 201. Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent Court”: A Newly Robust Ecosystem, 13 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 386, 386 (2014). 
 202. See Reines, supra note 12. 
 203. Timothy B. Lee, The Dixie Chicks and Robin Thicke Explain How to Fix the Patent System, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/07/the-dixie-
chicks-and-robin-thicke-explain-how-to-fix-the-patent-system/. 
 204. Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23. On percolation, the Chief Judge asserted as follows, along 
with borrowing the Dixie Chick’s chorus of the song “Wide Open Spaces”: 
The virtues of uniformity have their limits. No one wants to live in an echo 
chamber, and no thinker or innovator will get very far surrounded by a bunch of 
yes-men. The Supreme Court learns valuable lessons about which cases are the 
hardest, and which are most worthy of certiorari, by watching the development 
and resolution of conflicts in the circuits or the state supreme courts. Patent law, 
too, needs “wide open spaces / room to make [its] big mistakes.” Mistakes teach 
valuable lessons; they can reveal where the cracks in the foundation are and how 
they should be fixed. A proposition that seems obvious to one person might seem 
questionable to another, ambiguous to a third, and flatly wrong to a fourth. As in 
the song, percolation is needed despite (or maybe because of) the high stakes. 
Id. at 4 (quoting DIXIE CHICKS, WIDE OPEN SPACES). 
 205. Id. The Chief Judge argued that a specialized patent court is not needed because the doctrines 
between patent and other types of intellectual property are “blurred” and regional circuits are 
accustomed in handling these doctrines. Id. at 7. Also, the multiple perspectives from circuits are crucial 
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As expected, the Chief Judge’s statement attracted attention from 
mainstream media,206 blogs,207 and academic symposiums.208 Some 
viewed the statement as a “frontal assault”209 while others praised the 
importance of the statement and the prominence of the speaker to 
address patent jurisdiction.210 Many have articulated responses to the 
Chief Judge’s statement by proposing ways to enhance the 
percolation211 and competition to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive 
jurisdiction in patent cases.212 
                                                                                                                 
to the development of patent law, for example, non-obviousness: 
Again, this is an area where several circuits’ elaboration of competing viewpoints 
might prove useful: perhaps there are different ways, better ways, to approach 
non-obviousness. Speaking from my own experience, I can assure you that circuit 
splits and disagreements with colleagues force judges to sharpen their writing, 
push them to defend their positions, and from time to time persuade them that 
someone else’s perspective is preferable. This process of testing and 
experimentation is lost when uniformity is privileged above all other values. 
Id. at 5. 
 206. Ashby Jones, Critics Fault Court’s Grip on Appeals for Patents: Calls to Loosen Federal 
Circuit’s Hold Grows Amid Complaints Over Rulings, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2014, 7:10 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/critics-fault-courts-grip-on-appeals-for-patents-1404688219. 
 207. See generally Lance Duroni, Fed. Circ.’s Reign Over Patents Should End, Judge Says, LAW360 
(Sept. 26, 2013, 9:35 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/474687/fed-circ-s-reign-over-patents-
should-end-judge-says; Robert Williams, Should Patent Law Jurisdiction Be Spread Around?, PAT. L. 
BLOG (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.rtt-law.com/blogs/patent-law/should-patent-law-jurisdiction-be-
spread-around/. 
 208. See Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23. 
 209. Harold C. Wegner, Federal Circuit Exclusive Appellate Patent Jurisdiction: A Response to Chief 
Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 394, 394 (2014). 
 210. Lee, supra note 203 (“Wood’s use of song lyrics may have been fanciful, but her advocacy for 
curbing the Federal Circuit’s power over patent law is deadly serious. Academics have long advocated 
reining in the Federal Circuit. But having a jurist of Wood’s stature back the idea will give it greater 
credibility.”). 
 211. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350, 351–52 
(2014). Paul R. Gugliuzza offered his counter-argument to the Chief Judge’s lack of percolation 
argument: 
Judge Wood suggests that, due to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, 
patent doctrine is insufficiently “percolated,” meaning that it lacks mechanisms 
through which case law can be critiqued, reexamined, tested, and corrected, and 
issues worthy of Supreme Court review can be flagged. Yet percolating forces do 
exist in the patent system. For example, in the Federal Circuit, dissents critiquing 
existing doctrine are frequent and often lead to en banc proceedings reexamining 
and sometimes correcting the doctrine at issue. In addition, the Supreme Court, 
federal district courts, Congress, the Solicitor General, and the Patent and 
Trademark Office, among others, all provide, through various channels, diverse 
and influential perspectives that prevent patent law from becoming stale. 
Id. On “percolation,” Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss argues that now that a degree of nationwide 
uniformity in patent law has been achieved, it would be a pity to disrupt it. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, 
Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. 
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As of today, the Seventh Circuit has not acted on its Chief Judge’s 
demand for a share of the Federal Circuit’s patent docket.213 The 
Seventh Circuit has not overturned its precedent of declining 
jurisdiction when the patent question is substantial to the plaintiff’s 
claim under the well-pleaded complaint rule, nor has it followed the 
Eleventh Circuit’s lead in MDS.214 Instead, the Seventh Circuit’s 
Chief Judge generated public attention without actually grabbing 
jurisdiction.215 The Seventh Circuit invited litigants to seek its 
appellate jurisdiction by announcing that it is ready and able to 
handle complex cases.216 Whether the Seventh Circuit will exercise 
restraint or heed the Chief Judge’s statement remains to be seen. 
IV. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR CIRCUIT COURTS’ RESPONSES 
What could explain the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to grab 
jurisdiction in a patent claim construction and infringement case? 
What could explain the Seventh Circuit Chief Judge’s attention 
grabbing statement? Do they have judicial wisdom to offer or are 
they envious of the Federal Circuit’s rising prominence? Perhaps the 
                                                                                                                 
INTELL. PROP. 327, 330–48 (2014). While Chief Judge Wood is right that the law would improve with 
percolation, a change in the composition of the court, new procedures for challenging patents in the 
Patent and Trademark Office, a district court pilot program, and satellite patent offices will bring to the 
debate new voices, different kinds of expertise, and diverse experience. It is worth waiting to see how 
these changes play out. Id.  
 212.  Professor Rai believes that: 
 [C]ompetition [to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive patent jurisdiction] is indeed 
desirable. Whether such competition is best provided through additional appellate 
courts is unclear, however. In any event, given our current structure, the more 
tractable approach is to improve competitive input from sources that have already 
emerged. These include dissenting Federal Circuit judges, parties and amici who 
are not “patent insiders,” and perhaps, above all, the executive branch. 
Rai, supra note 201, at 387. 
 213. A search in Westlaw database for patent decisions in the Seventh Circuit yields none, as of 
January 25, 2015. 
 214. XCO Int’l Inc. v. Pac. Sci. Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “if Pac-Sci were 
challenging in a complaint for breach of contract the validity of an issued patent, this appeal would have 
to go to the Federal Circuit rather than to this court”) (citing U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 
813–14 (7th Cir. 1999)). 
 215. See Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23, at 6–7. 
 216. Id. at 10. 
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explanations are grounded in both judicial wisdom and patent envy, 
if any explanation exists at all. 
A. Judicial Wisdom and Patent Envy: Patents Are Common Today 
In 1982, when Congress created the Federal Circuit, 63,276 patents 
were granted.217 Patent law practice during this time was the 
“backwater” in the legal profession.218 More recently, in 2013 the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted 
302,948 patents. That is almost a 500% increase from 1982.219 Patent 
litigation and patent issues have become common headlines.220 Patent 
law practice is now part of several national law firms, generating 
handsome fees.221 Patent issues appear in daily newspapers and 
permeate the blogosphere.222 Patents are everywhere.223 
                                                                                                                 
 217. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2014, supra note 7. 
 218. See Reines, supra note 12 (“Although historically patent law was considered an esoteric 
backwater, it is now recognized as a dynamic legal field involving fascinating subjects and great 
financial stakes. Our world is filled with amazing new inventions that improve the way we work, how 
we are entertained, and our healthcare. Patent appeals now attract the finest advocates and garner 
national media attention.”). 
 219. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2014, supra note 7. 
 220. Media, from the local newspaper to National Geographic, cover patent issues. See, e.g., Melinda 
Johnston, Stallings Inventor Brian Conti Gains National Attention, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov. 
15, 2014, 12:00 AM) http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2014/11/15/5314841/stallings-inventor-brian-
conti.html#.VJznwV4C4; Ker Than, 7 Takeaways From Supreme Court’s Gene Patent Decision, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC, June 15, 2013, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/06/130614-supreme-court-
gene-patent-ruling-human-genome-science/. Patent issues are discussed from the White House to the 
state house. See Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, THE WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-
trolls-protect-american-innovation; see also Patent Trolling, STATE OF VERMONT (July 25, 2014), 
http://ago.vermont.gov/hot-topics/patent-trolling1.php. 
 221. See Best Law Firms for Patent Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
http://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/patent-law (last visited Jan. 8, 2016); GARY A. MUNNEKE, THE LEGAL 
CAREER GUIDE: FROM LAW STUDENT TO LAWYER 152 (4th ed. 2002) (“Patent law, once thought of as 
the backwater of legal practice, has become one of the hottest areas of practice with the explosion of 
technology in the world.”). 
 222. Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Ponders Trademark Odyssey of Sealtight vs. Sealtite, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 2, 2014, 5:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/tag/patent-and-trademark-office/; see also Brian 
Palmer, Jonas Salk: Good for Virology, Bad at Economics, SLATE, Apr. 13, 2014, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/history_of_innovation/2014/04/the_real_reasons_jonas_salk_d
idn_t_patent_the_polio_vaccine.html. 
 223. Patents are covered in radio. See, e.g., This American Life: When Patents Attack, WBEZ RADIO 
(July 22, 2011), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack. 
Patents are also covered in business papers. See, e.g., Steve Ivey, Making Their Mark: Louisville Patent 
Attorneys Play Key Roles in Invention Process, LOUISVILLE BUS. FIRST (May 27, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/print-edition/2011/05/27/making-their-mark-louisville-
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The Federal Circuit has enjoyed its expansive influence and has 
“become the envy of the system”224 with the rise in patent 
prominence. Its exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeal cases 
propels its unique role in the public eye.225 Established print sources, 
electronic media, and blogs vie to cover its latest decisions in patent 
cases.226 Some judges in the Federal Circuit sought the limelight, 
perhaps a little too much.227 Lawyers also brag about their alliances 
with the Federal Circuit.228 Furthermore, the clubby atmosphere has 
attracted unwanted attention and criticism.229 
                                                                                                                 
patent.html?page=all. Patents are also covered in specialized daily articles. See, e.g., Patent Output from 
the National Institutes of Health Vital to Understanding America’s Innovation Economy, SCIENCE 
DAILY (June 9, 2014), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/06/140609153512.htm. Patents are 
covered in newswire. See, e.g., CLIO USA: Procter & Gamble Suffers a Legal Setback in its 
Questionable Patent Claims involving Teeth Whiteners, PR NEWSWIRE (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/clio-usa-procter—gamble-suffers-a-legal-setback-in-its-
questionable-patent-claims-involving-teeth-whiteners-265675701.html. Lastly, patents are covered in 
national patent strategy papers. See, e.g., National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020), N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 2010), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy 
.pdf. 
 224. See Reines, supra note 12 (“In many ways, the Federal Circuit’s patent docket has become the 
envy of the system.”); see also Maggie Tamburro, Comment to The “Almighty” Federal Circuit 
Evolving? Patent Policy & Jurisprudence, IMS EXPERTSERVICES (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.ims-
expertservices.com/bullseye/january-2013/the-almighty-federal-circuit-evolving-patent-policy-
jurisprudence/. 
 225. The Federal Circuit itself is keenly aware of its rising importance. See, e.g., Hon. Kathleen M. 
O’Malley, Interesting Times at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 949, 956 (2014). Moreover, an 
empirical study has confirmed that the “district courts treat the Federal Circuit as more authoritative 
(compared to the Supreme Court) on patent law, than they treat the regional circuits (compared to the 
Supreme Court) on copyright law.” David Pekarek-Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent 
Precedent: An Empirical Study of Institutional Authority and IP Ideology 3 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of L. 
Scholarly Commons, Working Paper No. 42, 2010). 
 226. Tamburro, supra note 224; CLIO USA, supra note 223. 
 227. Ashby Jones & Brent Kendall, Top Judge Who Gave Lawyer Praise Recuses Himself From 
Patent Cases, Laudatory Email Raises Questions About Patent Bar, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2014, 5:50 
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303980004579578452919038262; see also Dan 
Levine, Insight: Rocker Judge Juggles Tech Policy, Supreme Court and the Stones, REUTERS, Dec. 11, 
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/11/us-usa-judge-rader-insight-idUSBRE9BA06 
D20131211. 
 228. Jones & Kendall, supra note 227. For example, one prominent patent attorney, Mr. Edward 
Reines, attempted to capitalize on his relationship with Judge Rader, then Chief Judge of the Federal 
Circuit. Id. Mr. Reines “chaired the Federal Circuit Advisory Council, a group of prominent patent 
lawyers that serve as a liaison between the court and the patent bar. Judge Rader appointed him to the 
position.” Id. 
 229. Id. (describing the clubby atmosphere between the Federal Circuit and the patent bar). The recent 
email controversy in the Federal Circuit has attracted attention from the Wall Street Journal and the 
ABA to Above the Law blog. See Ashby Jones, Email Controversy Leads to Reprimand of Weil Gotshal 
Patent Lawyer, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/11/05/ 
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Hardly any other district court or circuit court has shared the same 
level of prominence in such a short period: a little more than thirty 
years from creation.230 More patents being granted by the USPTO 
means an increase in volume of patent litigation cases filed in district 
courts231 and higher numbers of patent appeals reviewed in the 
Federal Circuit.232 Inevitably, the Federal Circuit continues to enjoy 
its rise in stature.233 The sister circuit courts cannot do anything 
because they have no authority to hear patent cases.234 As the Chief 
Judge of the Seventh Circuit advocates for a share in patent cases in 
the name of judicial wisdom—having different circuit courts to hear 
patent appeals—the judicial wisdom argument runs hollow through 
the lense of envy. The Eleventh Circuit leaped a step further, actually 
grabbing patent jurisdiction instead of just demanding a share of 
                                                                                                                 
email-controversy-leads-to-reprimand-of-weil-gotshal-patent-lawyer/; see also David Lat, Federal 
Circuit Benchslaps Prominent Patent Practitioner, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 5, 2014, 2:39 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/11/federal-circuit-benchslaps-prominent-patent-practitioner/; Martha Neil, 
Federal Appeals Court Blasts Attorney for Forwarding Chief Judge’s Congratulatory Email, A.B.A. J. 
(Nov. 5, 2014, 4:18 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
federal_appeals_court_scolds_prominent_patent_attorney_for_circulating_judg/. 
 230. If reversal rate by the Supreme Court is a measurement of stature, the Ninth Circuit leads the 
pack with having the largest number of cases heard and reversed by the Supreme Court. See Circuit 
Scorecard, SCOTUSBLOG (July 3, 2014), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ 
SCOTUSblog_scorecard_OT13.pdf. 
 231. Chris Barry, Ronen Arad, Landan Ansell & Evan Clark, 2013 Patent Litigation Study: Big Cases 
Make Headlines, While Patent Cases Proliferate, PWC (2013), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/ 
forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf (studying the increase in patent 
cases filed in district courts); see also Lex Machina Releases First Annual Patent Litigation Year in 
Review, LEX MACHINA (May 13, 2014), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lex-machina-releases-first-
annual-patent-litigation-review/ (comparing 6,092 new patent cases filed in 2013, a 12.4% increase from 
2012). 
 232. Since 2011 the Federal Circuit saw an increase in the number of patent infringement appeals. See 
Filings of Patent Infringement Appeals from the U.S. District Courts, supra note 5. Patent cases from 
the district courts, the USPTO, and the ITC comprises a total of 48% of all cases in the Federal Circuit 
during FY2013. See Appeals Filed, by Category FY 2013, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, http:www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/fy%2013%20filings 
%20by%20category.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 233. A national newspaper has observed that the Federal Circuit’s profile “has skyrocketed in recent 
years, alongside the rise of big-dollar patent disputes, such as those between technology giants Apple 
Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co.” Jones & Kendall, supra note 227. 
 234. Sister circuit courts routinely transfer cases involving patents as substantial question to the 
Federal Circuit. See, e.g., USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 277–80 (5th Cir. 2011); 
U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 813–14 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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patent appeals, and now watching the fiasco of consequences cascade 
down from MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies.235 
The only court that can legitimately hear patent cases on appeals 
other than the Federal Circuit is the court of last resort, the Supreme 
Court of the United States.236 The Supreme Court has also tried its 
best to inject itself into patent cases by accepting an unusually high 
number of patent cases in recent years, while the total certiorari grant 
for all cases has decreased.237 The rise of patents and their 
importance guarantees that Supreme Court patent decisions will 
generate media coverage.238 However, sharing the limelight has its 
own cost; with its lack of patent law expertise, the Supreme Court 
has seen its own setbacks and has endured ridicule for ignorance of 
patent law in some instances.239 
                                                                                                                 
 235. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Tech., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 841 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 236. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for 
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 657 (2009). 
 237. See Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court Versus Patent Law, LINKEDIN (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140403210921-2503830-supreme-court-versus-patent-law; Ryan J. 
Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1219, 1229 (2012). 
 238. See generally Noah Feldman, Ready for a Patented Supreme Court Smackdown?, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (Oct. 15, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-10-15/ready-for-a-
patented-supreme-court-smackdown; Mark Grabowski, Are Technical Difficulties at the Supreme Court 
Causing a “Disregard of Duty”?, 3 J. L., TECH. & INTERNET 93, 93 (2011) (“Supreme Court Justices 
lately have displayed a startling level of ignorance about computing and communication methods that 
many Americans take for granted”); Brent Kendall, Akamai-Limelight Patent Case Goes Before Top 
Court, Justices Consider Whether to Make It Easier to Hold Companies Liable for Encouraging 
Infringement by Others, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2014, 6:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303948104579534063156736196. 
 239. See Hon. Timothy B. Dyk, Does The Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U.L. REV. 763, 763 
(2008) (“At any gathering of the [patent] bar, no tag line of a speech has more assurance of applause 
than one that importunes the Supreme Court to keep its hands off the patent law.”). See also Courtenay 
C. Brinckerhoff, Supreme Court Reverses Federal Circuit On Induced Infringement in Limelight 
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: PHARMAPATENTS (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2014/06/02/supreme-court-requires-direct-infringement-to-support-
induced-infringement-in-limelight-networks-inc-v-akamai-technologies-inc/ (“The Supreme Court 
decision comes close to being openly disrespectful to the Federal Circuit.”); Jeff Guo, The Supreme 
Court Reveals its Ignorance of Genetics, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 13, 2013, 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113476/supreme-court-genetics-ruling-reveals-judges-ignorance; 
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B. Judicial Wisdom and Patent Envy: Lack of Multiple Perspectives 
The Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit champions the view that 
the development of patent law needs the assistance from the Seventh 
Circuit and other sister circuits.240 The value of having multiple 
perspectives is important for percolation of patent doctrines.241 In 
other words, the Federal Circuit lacks the medium for percolation; 
the Federal Circuit’s exclusivity cabins the development of patent 
law. The lack of multiple perspectives results in a lack of judicial 
wisdom.242 
The judicial wisdom argument does not have much support, as 
explained by scholars, and will not be repeated here.243 The judicial 
wisdom argument, however, is clothed in patent envy disguised with 
care. Again, it is understandable for circuit courts wanting to have 
appellate jurisdiction to hear patent cases. The size of the patent pie 
is getting too large compared to thirty-three years ago when the 
Federal Circuit was first created.244 Not only growth in quantity or 
size, but also the quality of the patent pie vis-à-vis patent importance 
in the economy has prompted the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits to 
grab attention and jurisdiction.245 Dismissing the patent envy 
argument is easy to do, but the reality is that Circuits have taken steps 
to keep the Federal Circuit from retaining exclusive patent 
jurisdiction: the Eleventh Circuit has injected uncertainty in 
substantive patent law in the area of claim construction, and the Chief 
Judge of the Seventh Circuit has demanded a share of patent appeal 
cases.246 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23. 
 241. Golden, supra note 236, at 673. 
 242. Timothy B. Lee conducted an interview on September 26, 2014, and received the following 
comments from Robin Feldman, a critic of the Federal Circuit: “Without the disciplining effect of 
frequent supervision or dialogue among other circuits, it’s difficult to avoid becoming insular. In other 
words, problems at the Federal Circuit are structurally predictable.” Timothy B. Lee, Why the Supreme 
Court Keeps Smacking Down America’s Top Patent Court, VOX (Sept. 26, 2014, 10:40 AM), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/9/26/6846713/why-the-supreme-court-keeps-smacking-down-americas-top-
patent-court. 
 243. See Harold C. Wegner, Federal Circuit Exclusive Appellate Patent Jurisdiction: A Response to 
Chief Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 394, 401 (2014). 
 244. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 – 2014, supra note 7. 
 245. See discussion supra note 223. 
 246. See MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Tech., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 2013); Hon. Diane 
37
Nguyen: Judicial Wisdom or Patent Envy?
Published by Reading Room, 2015
340 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
Whether judicial wisdom and patent envy are possible 
explanations for the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits’ conduct, the 
question remains: should patent appeals be decided by different 
regional circuits and, if so, under what circumstances? If sound 
reasons exist for the end of exclusive patent jurisdiction, regional 
circuits must demonstrate that they are ready to analyze substantive 
patent issues. If they exhibit conduct similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s 
experiment in the MDS case, the end of patent law uniformity will 
arrive in the midst of escalation in forum shopping. 
V. TOWARD A MORE LEGITIMATE GROUND: FEDERALISM 
PRINCIPLES 
There is perhaps a more legitimate ground for regional circuit 
courts to claim their share of the patent jurisdiction from the Federal 
Circuit. Federalism is the driving force for obtaining their share of 
jurisdiction. 
A. Federalism Principles 
Regional circuit courts can exert their jurisdiction over patent 
cases under federalism principles.247 They can retain diversity 
jurisdiction in cases of strong state interest that will not disrupt the 
federal-state judicial balance. Specifically, regional circuit courts can 
assert that the state has a strong responsibility in matters underlying 
state claims that are intertwined with patents. Indeed, in addition to 
requiring that the patent issue must be “actually disputed and 
substantial,” the Supreme Court also instructed federal courts to exert 
federal question jurisdiction over state claims only in rare cases 
where doing so will not disturb “any congressionally approved 
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”248 In other 
                                                                                                                 
P. Wood, supra note 23. 
 247. Federalism in the United States is the legal relationship and distribution of power between the 
federal government and state governments. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 729 (10th ed. 2014). 
 248. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005). 
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words, federalism principles are important, and courts must adhere to 
them as not to “upset the federal-state division of judicial labor.”249 
Federalism separates two spheres, federal government and state 
government, in the administering of governance as propounded in the 
Constitution.250 State claims are in the provenance of state courts;251 
federal courts must confine themselves to the jurisdiction “conferred 
on it by Congress and permitted by the Constitution.”252 If litigants 
bring state claims in federal courts based on diversity, regional circuit 
courts will then have jurisdiction, even if the case may insubstantially 
involve patent issues.253 Consequently, the Federal Circuit will have 
no jurisdiction over the case.254 For example, in legal malpractice 
cases where clients bring suits against their former lawyers for failure 
to present certain defenses in an earlier patent infringement litigation, 
the states have special responsibility for maintaining standards 
among members of licensed professions, including the legal 
profession.255 The federal system has no interest in interfering with 
states’ interest in policing the licensed professions.256 Indeed, there is 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., 
dissenting) (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 313–14). 
 250. In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that federal courts, as courts of limited 
jurisdiction, must pay “due regard for the constitutional allocation of powers between the state and 
federal systems [which] requires a federal court scrupulously to confine itself to the jurisdiction 
conferred on it by Congress and permitted by the Constitution”); see also Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 
538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing federalism and judicial responsibilities); Grable, 545 U.S. 
at 313–14 (“[T]he federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if federal jurisdiction is 
consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal 
courts . . . . ”). 
 251. See In re Carter, 618 F.2d at 1098. 
 252. Id. 
 253. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of 
the United States . . . .”). A regional circuit has jurisdiction over appeals based on diversity jurisdiction 
in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 
U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (holding that the regional circuit court has jurisdiction over the appeal, not the 
Federal Circuit court, because the claim did not arise under patent law). 
 254. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 819. 
 255. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 
447, 460 (1978)); see also Singh, 538 F.3d at 339 (holding that legal malpractice claim in a trademark 
case is within the jurisdiction of state courts, not federal courts because “federal jurisdiction over this 
state-law malpractice claim would upend the balance between federal and state judicial 
responsibilities”). 
 256. Singh, 538 F.3d at 339 (“Legal malpractice has traditionally been the domain of state law, and 
federal law rarely interferes with the power of state authorities to regulate the practice of law.”). 
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no federal law or policy imposing a mandate that states must 
withdraw from policing licensed lawyers and that state courts have 
no authority to preside over legal malpractice claims “simply because 
they require resolution of a hypothetical patent issue.”257 Federalism 
principles dictate that state claim in cases where the patent issue is 
collateral fall within state courts’ jurisdictions,258 and state claims in 
cases that rely on diversity jurisdiction fall within regional circuit 
courts’ jurisdictions. 
Ignoring federalism, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional overreach 
in recent years on state claims,259 including legal malpractice cases, 
has become a subject of criticism.260 Some courts have ridiculed the 
Federal Circuit for its fundamental misunderstanding of federalism, 
complaining that “under the Federal Circuit’s approach, the 
federalism element is simply an invocation of the need for uniformity 
in patent law.”261 Moreover, courts have said the Federal Circuit’s 
approach is “disheartening given the potential consequences on the 
division between state and federal courts beyond the purview of 
patent disputes.”262 The Supreme Court has recently reigned in the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional overreach under federalism 
principles.263 In other words, the Federal Circuit’s dated 
interpretation of federalism is no longer legitimate.264 The Federal 
                                                                                                                 
 257. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068. 
 258. See, e.g., id.; Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 651–52 (Tex. 2011) (discussing federalism, the 
division between federal and state courts, and that state courts have jurisdiction in a malpractice claim 
because “the federal issue here is collateral, not basic” and the malpractice claim “does not impact any 
live patent law claims”). 
 259. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 
1803–04 (criticizing that the Federal Circuit has used its own framework of federalism to expand its 
jurisdiction “over legal claims created by state law”); see also Singh, 538 F.3d at 339–40 (declining to 
follow the Federal Circuit’s overreach in the state claims area because the Federal Circuit “did not 
consider the reasons addressed here, involving the federal interest and the effect on federalism”). 
 260. See Gugliuzza, supra note 259, at 1810. Judge O’Malley has forcefully critiqued the Federal 
Circuit for developing case law hoarding jurisdiction in cases of state concerns, as the case law “has 
poisoned the well, and it will only serve to exacerbate the federalism concerns.” Byrne v. Wood, Herron 
& Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 261. Minton, 355 S.W. 3d at 652. 
 262. Id. at 652–53 (Guzman, J., dissenting); see also Singh, 538 F.3d at 340. 
 263. See, e.g., Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068. 
 264. Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 652 (observing that the Federal Circuit’s brand of federalism means for 
“the benefits of a federal forum, the need for uniformity in patent law, and the fact that patents are 
issued by a federal agency” and has “no consideration of what effect asserting exclusive federal 
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Circuit must relinquish control over a case when there is no 
justification to retain jurisdiction.265 Regional circuit courts can now 
rely on federalism principles to retain diversity jurisdiction in cases 
of strong state interest that will not disturb the balance of federal and 
state judicial responsibilities.266 
In summary, federalism is a cornerstone of the U.S. legal system. 
The separation between state and federal systems is important to the 
balance of all branches of government. Division between state and 
federal courts means that not every case mentioning patents should 
automatically provide a ground for the Federal Circuit to assert its 
jurisdiction. Neither the Federal Circuit nor any other circuit court 
should overreach its jurisdictional authority. 
B. Patent Issues are Non-substantial and Hypothetical 
Regional circuit courts can also retain jurisdiction in cases where 
patent issues are intertwined with state claim issues, as long as the 
patent issues are non-substantial and hypothetical. The patent legal 
malpractice cases are not the same type of cases governed by the 
well-pleaded complaint rule under Christianson.267 For example, in a 
legal malpractice case stemming from the lawyer’s representation in 
a prior patent litigation, the patent issue is typically non-substantial 
and the consequence of what the lawyer has allegedly failed to do is 
hypothetical in nature.268 Regarding the state’s interest, however, in 
legal malpractice for regulating the legal profession, it is paramount 
that state courts and not federal courts decide.269 Undoubtedly, if the 
                                                                                                                 
jurisdiction would have over the balance between the state and federal judiciaries intended by 
Congress.”) (citing Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 
1262, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (“[T]he 
question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and 
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved 
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”). 
 267. See, e.g., Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1034–36 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(O’Malley, J., dissenting) (observing a number of legal malpractice cases involving patent issues are not 
substantial and pose no serious threat to the uniformity of patent law). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 1038 (noting that in patent-related legal malpractice cases, “states undoubtedly have a 
strong interest and role in regulating the conduct of all of their respective attorneys, as well as in 
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case is in federal court due to diversity jurisdiction,270 the regional 
circuits will have appellate jurisdiction.271 
The Federal Circuit has overreached its “patent hand” and retained 
jurisdiction in patent-related legal malpractice cases under the 
rhetoric of patent uniformity and substantiality, causing disarray in 
this area.272 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Gunn v. 
Minton, gave order to this disarray where legal malpractice is 
intertwined with patent issues.273 In Gunn, Vernon Minton was a 
computer programmer who developed a program for securities 
trading and obtained a patent for his invention in 2000.274 In 1995, 
prior to filing for patent protection, Minton leased his computer 
program to TEXCEN, a securities brokerage.275 Minton then asserted 
a patent infringement claim against NASDAQ and others.276 
NASDAQ raised a defense that Minton’s patent was invalid under 
the “on sale” bar, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), because he released 
his program to the TEXCEN securities brokerage more than one year 
before he sought patent protection.277 Minton argued that what he 
leased to TEXCEN was different from his patent, but the district 
court rejected his argument and granted NASDAQ summary 
judgment.278 Minton then requested reconsideration from the district 
court based on an argument raised for the first time that his release of 
the program was within the “experimental use” exception to the “on 
                                                                                                                 
protecting all of their residents from negligent legal services”). 
 270. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (diversity jurisdiction). 
 271. Court Role and Structure, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Jan. 11, 2016). 
 272. Byrne, 676 F.3d at 1031–33 (explaining how the Federal Circuit has shaped its precedents in 
reaching jurisdiction over legal malpractice cases and the precedents have been “out of step with that of 
other federal and state courts.”); see also Gugliuzza, supra note 259, at 1815–19 (observing the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdictional expansion in recent years). 
 273. See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (finding that malpractice claims involving 
patent issues only if it “raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal 
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state 
responsibilities”) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 
(2005)). 
 274. Id. at 1062. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
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sale” bar.279 The district court denied the reconsideration motion as 
untimely, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.280 
Thereafter, Minton brought a legal malpractice suit against his 
lawyer, Gunn, for failure to timely raise the experimental use 
exception that may have resulted in the invalidation of his patent and 
the loss in his prior patent infringement suit against NASDAQ.281 
Gunn moved for summary judgment upon a showing that Minton’s 
release of the program was not an experimental use, meaning the 
experimental use exception would have failed in the patent lawsuit, 
regardless of whether the exception was timely raised.282 Minton then 
appealed the legal malpractice action and argued that his malpractice 
claim arose under federal patent law, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which 
provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over “any claim for relief 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.”283 Minton 
asserted that, as a result, the Texas state court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over his case.284 Minton wanted his legal malpractice 
case heard anew in federal court.285 The Texas Court of Appeals, 
however, affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment decision and 
held that the federal interests in Minton’s state claim of legal 
malpractice were not sufficiently substantial for jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1338(a).286 The case then reached the Supreme Court of 
Texas.287 That Court, relying on two Federal Circuit decisions on 
similar facts, reversed the Texas Court of Appeals.288 Subsequently, 
the Supreme Court of the United States accepted review.289 
                                                                                                                 
 279. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1062–63. 
 280. Id. at 1063. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063. 
 286. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s test in Grable & Sons Metal 
Prods., Inc.,v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), to determine when a state law claim may give 
rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
 287. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011). 
 288. Id. The Texas Supreme Court relied on Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, 
LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007), to reach its decision. Id. at 641–42 
 289. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its precedent test for 
determining when federal jurisdiction over a state claim implicates a 
federal issue or when a state claim is “arising under” federal 
jurisdiction: “if a federal issue is (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually 
disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court 
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by 
Congress.”290 Applying the four-part test, the Gunn Court concluded 
that resolution of the experimental use exception to the on sale bar 
was “necessary” to Minton’s legal malpractice because he had to 
establish that he would have prevailed in his patent infringement suit 
against NASDAQ if his lawyer, Gunn, had timely raised the 
exception.291 Also, the federal issue was “actually disputed” because 
Minton and Gunn disputed on the merits whether the experimental 
use exception would apply to rescue Minton’s patent infringement 
case against NASDAQ.292 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that 
the federal issue in this case was “not substantial in the relevant 
sense.”293 The Supreme Court required that “the substantiality 
inquiry . . . looks instead to the importance of the issue to the federal 
system as a whole.”294 
The Supreme Court cited two examples of a federal issue that was 
“substantial” enough to “the federal system as a whole” to trigger 
federal jurisdiction over a state claim. The first instance is where the 
issue was federally imposed notice requirements prior to the IRS’s 
seizure and sale of property, which the government has a “strong 
interest” to validly recover delinquent taxes through seizure and sale 
of property.295 The second instance is where the case depends upon 
the determination of “the constitutional validity of an act of Congress 
which is directly drawn in question.”296 
                                                                                                                 
 290. Id. at 1065. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 1065–66. 
 293. Id. at 1066. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 
308, 310–11 (2005)). 
 296. Id. (citing Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921)). 
44
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/1
2016] JUDICIAL WISDOM OR PATENT ENVY 347 
The Supreme Court distinguished the facts in Gunn from the two 
classic examples above because the federal issue in the present case 
“carries no such significance.”297 It failed the “substantiality inquiry” 
due to “the backward-looking nature of a legal malpractice claim,” 
because the question is “posed in a merely hypothetical sense.”298 
Regardless of how state courts resolve the hypothetical case of 
whether patent infringement would have been found if “Minton’s 
lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use argument,” the 
resolution would “not change the real-world result of the prior federal 
patent litigation.”299 Most importantly, state courts resolving legal 
malpractice cases intertwined with patent issues will not undermine 
“the development of a uniform body of [patent] law.”300 
The new order from Gunn is clear: no federal jurisdiction exists 
over a state claim where the federal issue is not substantial, 
particularly in patent-related legal malpractice cases.301 That means 
state courts will preside over these types of cases, and higher-level 
state courts will have appellate jurisdiction. Regional federal circuit 
courts will have appellate jurisdiction to preside over these types of 
cases only if diversity jurisdiction exists in the district court.302 Also, 
the Supreme Court recognized in Gunn v. Minton that state courts can 
have jurisdiction in cases where the patent issue is intertwined with 
state claims, as long as state courts’ decisions have no real-world 
impact on, and do not undermine the development of, a uniform body 
of patent law.303 In other words, the Supreme Court affirmed that the 
mandate for the development of a uniform body of patent law is an 
important federal interest.304 Consequently, if regional circuit courts 
have appellate jurisdiction over these types of state claims 
                                                                                                                 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 1066–67. 
 299. Id. at 1067. 
 300. Id. at 1067 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)). 
 301. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067. 
 302. See generally USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 541 F. App’x 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(retaining jurisdiction through diversity because the “hypothetical patent issues between the parties to 
this case are fact-specific and of no importance to the federal system” as a whole, as required for 
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit). 
 303. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067. 
 304. See id. 
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intertwined with a patent issue due to diversity jurisdiction, the patent 
issue must not be a substantial issue in that the circuit courts’ 
decisions and must not undermine the development of a uniform 
body of patent law.305 
Moreover, in applying the Supreme Court’s mandate in Gunn to 
breach of patent license agreement cases that require resolution of 
whether the defendant’s products are covered by the licensed patent, 
the patent question is substantial because it satisfies Gunn’s 
“substantiality inquiry.” The resolution of such cases require the 
court to engage in patent claim construction and infringement 
analysis in order to determine the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim 
against the defendant for violating contract provisions covered by the 
licensed patents. Additionally, the uniform development of patent 
claim construction and infringement analysis is of paramount 
importance to federal courts. Without having consistent rules in these 
two key features of all patent cases, uncertainty and forum shopping 
problems will once again plague the patent system. In other words, 
patent claim construction and infringement analyses are not 
“hypothetical”306 without “real-world effect[s].”307 This is evidenced 
by Congress purposely creating the Federal Circuit to end uncertainty 
and forum shopping and to create a uniform patent system where 
patent claim construction and infringement analysis are at the center 
of patent issues.308 Consequently, under Gunn, regional circuit courts 
will not have jurisdiction to hear well-pleaded complaint cases where 
the patent question is substantial, as seen in U.S. Valves and 
Scherbatskoy. 
                                                                                                                 
 305. See, e.g., Cty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(addressing underlying issues of patent law to resolve a state-law malpractice claim). 
 306. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 1068 (“We have no reason to suppose that Congress—in establishing exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over patent cases—meant to bar from state courts state legal malpractice claims simply 
because they require resolution of a hypothetical patent issue.”). 
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C. Patent Counterclaims, Not Compulsory Counterclaims 
Another opportunity for regional circuits to extend jurisdiction in 
cases involving patents presents itself if the patent claims are 
counterclaims. If the patent counterclaims are compulsory, the 
Federal Circuit will have exclusive jurisdiction, marking a change 
from prior law.309 
In its recent major overhaul of patent law, Congress amended 
patent jurisdiction statutory provisions.310 Congress provided that the 
Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction from a final 
decision of a federal district court in any civil action arising under 
patent statutes.311 Also, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2003) (holding that 
patent compulsory counterclaims do not serve as the basis for federal courts’ “arising under 
jurisdiction”). Specifically, the Vornado court explained: 
[W]hether a case arises under federal patent law “cannot depend upon the 
answer.” . . . It follows that a counterclaim—which appears as part of the 
defendant’s answer, not as part of the plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the 
basis for “arising under” jurisdiction. 
 Allowing a counterclaim to establish “arising under” jurisdiction 
would also contravene the longstanding policies underlying our precedents. First, 
since the plaintiff is “the master of the complaint,” the well-pleaded complaint 
rule enables him, by eschewing claims based on federal law . . . to have the cause 
heard in state court. The rule proposed by respondent, in contrast, would leave 
acceptance or rejection of a state forum to the master of the counterclaim. It 
would allow a defendant to remove a case brought in state court under state law, 
thereby defeating a plaintiff’s choice of forum, simply by raising a federal 
counterclaim. Second, conferring this power upon the defendant would radically 
expand the class of removable cases, contrary to the “[d]ue regard for the rightful 
independence of state governments” that our cases addressing removal require. 
And finally, allowing responsive pleadings by the defendant to establish “arising 
under” jurisdiction would undermine the clarity and ease of administration of the 
well-pleaded-complaint doctrine, which serves as a “quick rule of thumb” for 
resolving jurisdictional conflicts. 
Id. at 831–32 (internal citations omitted). 
 310. See generally Paul M. Schoenhard, Gaps, Conflicts and Ambiguities in the Federal Courts’ Post-
AIA Patent Jurisdiction, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 20 (2013) (discussing the newly amended 
statutory provisions for federal district courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictions). 
 311. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) now reads, in relevant part: 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United 
States, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the 
District Court of the Northern Mariana Islands, in any civil action arising under, 
or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim 
arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection. 
Id. 
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jurisdiction in any civil action in which a party asserts a compulsory 
counterclaim arising under patent statutes.312 
According to the legislative history relating to the amendment of 
the patent statute on compulsory counter claim jurisdiction, the 
definition for “compulsory counterclaim” is the same definition 
provided in Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.313 To 
satisfy the definition, the compulsory counterclaim must arise out of 
the same transaction or occurrence and not require the joinder of 
parties over whom the court would lack jurisdiction.314 The rationale 
for the requirement that the counterclaim must be “compulsory” in 
order for the Federal Circuit to have appellate jurisdiction is to 
prevent the possibility that a “defendant could raise unrelated and 
unnecessary patent counterclaims simply in order to manipulate 
appellate jurisdiction.”315 
Consequently, the new patent jurisdiction statutory provision 
allows regional circuit courts to have appellate jurisdiction in cases 
where the patent question is not a compulsory counterclaim.316 In 
such cases, the patent question is merely a counterclaim that involves 
different factual and legal issues and arises from different 
transactions or occurrences. That means the regional circuits will 
retain jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit must transfer cases 
involving patent counterclaims to regional circuit courts. 
For example, in U.S. Water Services, Inc. v. ChemTreat, Inc., the 
Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal after the Federal 
Circuit transferred the case.317 In that case, U.S. Water Services 
(USWS) filed a trade secret misappropriation lawsuit against 
                                                                                                                 
 312. Id. 
 313. 157 CONG. REC. S1378, S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). See also Joe 
Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 
540 (2013) (discussing the legislative history of the amended patent jurisdiction provisions or the 
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Circulations Systems, Inc. fix). 
 314. 157 CONG. REC. at S1379. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Schoenhard, supra note 310, at 22 (observing that the new statutory provision for the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction over patent compulsory counterclaims “comes at a price: [because] all circuit 
courts must now conduct a threshold inquiry into whether a ‘compulsory counterclaim’ was 
‘asserted.’”). 
 317. U.S. Water Servs., Inc. v. ChemTreat, Inc., 570 Fed. App’x 924, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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ChemTreat under Minnesota law.318 ChemTreat filed a counterclaim 
of invalidity and non-infringement of one of USWS’s patents.319 The 
parties then settled the lawsuit, and the district court granted a 
judgment of non-infringement in ChemTreat’s favor.320 USWS 
appealed the district court’s non-infringement decision to the Federal 
Circuit.321 The Federal Circuit observed that the patent issue was first 
raised in a counterclaim that was not a “compulsory counterclaim” 
and held that the case did not arise under patent law.322 The Federal 
Circuit, therefore, had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the 
patent issue was merely supplemental.323 The Federal Circuit 
transferred the case to the Eighth Circuit.324 
Also, in Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., the Federal Circuit 
transferred the appeal to the Third Circuit because the patent claim 
was not a compulsory counterclaim.325 In that case, Mr. Wawrzynski 
developed and obtained a patent for “Method of Food Article 
Dipping and Wiping in a Condimental Container.”326 He sent his 
patented invention of condiment packaging and promotional 
materials to the Heinz Company in request for a meeting.327 The 
Heinz Company representatives met with Mr. Wawrzynski.328 
Thereafter, they expressed disinterest in his packaging and declined a 
second meeting.329 
A few months later, the Heinz Company released its new “Dip & 
Squeeze” package.330 Wawrzynski then filed a lawsuit in Michigan 
state court against the Heinz Company relating to the “Dip & 
Squeeze” package, alleging breach of implied contract and unjust 
enrichment based on Heinz’s alleged use of Wawrzynski’s ideas for 
                                                                                                                 
 318. Id. at 925. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See id. at 925–26 n.2. 
 323. U.S. Water Servs., 570 Fed. App’x at 926. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., 728 F.3d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 326. Id. at 1376. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. 
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condiment packaging.331 Heinz successfully moved to transfer the 
action from Michigan state court to the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction.332 Heinz then filed an answer, affirmative defenses, a 
counterclaim that alleged non-infringement of the Wawrzynski 
patent, and that the patent was invalid.333 Prior to filing a response, 
Wawrzynski claimed he had already granted Heinz a covenant not to 
sue for patent infringement.334 Wawrzynski filed an answer to 
Heinz’s counterclaim that he was not suing Heinz for patent 
infringement and sought to dismiss Heinz’s counterclaim for failure 
to present a case or controversy, among other deficiencies.335 The 
district court denied Wawrzynski’s motion.336 Subsequently, Heinz 
moved for summary judgment arguing that Wawrzynski’s other 
claims were preempted by federal patent law and that there was non-
infringement of Wawrzynski’s patent; the district court ruled in 
Heinz’s favor.337 Among other issues raised on appeal, Wawrzynski 
asserted that he never alleged patent infringement in this case, and 
therefore the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.338 
With respect to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over compulsory 
counterclaims arising under patent law, the Federal Circuit observed 
that the plaintiff’s complaint was filed prior to the effective date of 
the newly amended Section 1295—the provision conferring the 
Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over counterclaims.339 
                                                                                                                 
 331. Wawrzynski, 728 F.3d at 1376. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 1376–77. 
 334. Id. at 1377. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Wawrzynski, 728 F.3d at 1377. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 1378–79. The Wawrzynski court noted: 
Even assuming that Heinz’s counterclaim was compulsory, Mr. Wawrzynski’s 
case does not meet the effective date requirement of the AIA version of § 1295, 
which applies to “any civil action commenced on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act,” which is September 16, 2011. Pub. L. 112–29, § 19(e), 
125 Stat. 284, 333. Mr. Wawrzynski’s complaint was filed and the “action 
commenced” prior to this date. The plain language of § 1295 provides no 
exceptions to its effective date requirement. 
Id. 
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Moreover, even if the effective date was not an issue, Heinz’s 
counterclaim was not compulsory because both parties did not 
consent to litigate the patent infringement claim.340 Specifically, the 
Federal Circuit explained: 
Mr. Wawrzynski cannot point to an express or implied 
consent by the parties to litigate Heinz’s counterclaim. 
Quite to the contrary, Mr. Wawrzynski moved on two 
separate occasions to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis 
of lack of jurisdiction. In order to divest the counterclaim, 
Mr. Wawrzynski went so far as to admit in his pleadings 
that Heinz did not infringe the ′990 patent and to provide 
Heinz with a covenant not to sue. Heinz certainly wished to 
litigate its counterclaim, but one party’s consent is not 
sufficient for us to deem the complaint amended.341 
In addition to the lack of a compulsory counterclaim, the Federal 
Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction to retain the case under the 
well-pleaded complaint doctrine for patent infringement because Mr. 
Wawrzynski insisted that he had filed the original complaint only 
under state claims with clear intentions.342 In addition, Mr. 
Wawrzynski insisted that Heinz did not infringe his patent because he 
provided Heinz with the covenant not to sue.343 Accordingly, the case 
came to the federal court via diversity jurisdiction, not via well-
pleaded complaint patent infringement jurisdiction.344 
                                                                                                                 
 340. Id. at 1378–79. 
 341. Id. at 1379. 
 342. Id. at 1380–81. 
 343. Wawrzynski, 728 F.3d at 1379. 
 344. Id. at 1381. The Federal Circuit further explained: 
[W]e have concluded that the relief requested in the complaint aligns with state 
law claims and not a claim for patent infringement. We also found support for Mr. 
Wawrzynski’s contention that certain of the ideas and materials he allegedly 
provided to Heinz are not found in his patent. These conclusions, along with our 
overarching conclusion that the complaint does not present a well-pleaded patent 
law issue, undercut conclusions relied upon by the district court to support its 
grant of summary judgment of preemption. Accordingly, it appears that nothing 
in federal patent law now stands in the way of Mr. Wawrzynski pursuing his state 
law claims. 
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In light of the above-cited cases decided prior to the amendment to 
the patent jurisdiction statutory provisions, regional circuit courts 
will face difficult questions conducting inquiries for jurisdiction. 
Specifically, courts will have to address whether the counterclaim 
was “compulsory” and when the “compulsory counterclaim” was 
“asserted.”345 
In summary, there are several grounds for regional circuit courts to 
have jurisdiction in patent cases. Those grounds include cases where 
(1) the patent issues are not substantial,346 (2) states have a strong 
interest in the non-patent issues under federalism,347 and (3) the 
patent claim is a non-compulsory counterclaim.348 Regional circuit 
courts and, when appropriate, state appellate courts must properly 
exercise their jurisdiction; they should not shy away from cases when 
they see and hear the word “patent.” Conversely, the Federal Circuit 
must loosen its grip in the three identified areas discussed above. 
CONCLUSION 
The new jurisdictional battle waged by the Eleventh and Seventh 
Circuits for a share of patent cases will erode the Federal Circuit’s 
exclusive patent jurisdiction. There are legitimate grounds for 
regional circuits to share patent cases with the Federal Circuit. 
Regional circuit courts, through diversity jurisdiction, can retain 
appellate jurisdiction in cases where patent issues are insubstantial 
and hypothetical in comparison to state law claims wielding strong 
state interests. In addition, regional circuit courts can exert 
jurisdiction over non-compulsory patent counterclaims. Most 
importantly, in light of the rise in patent prominence and the growth 
of patent jurisprudence stewarded solely by the Federal Circuit in the 
last thirty-three years, regional circuit courts must proceed with 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 345. Schoenhard, supra note 310, at 22–23 (observing that circuit courts’ jurisdictional inquiry 
“involves a question of timing. Is jurisdiction based on any counterclaims, as originally filed? As 
amended? Or, as . . . extant at the time appeal is taken?”). 
 346. See supra Part V.B. 
 347. See supra Part V.A. 
 348. See supra Part V.C. 
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utmost care. After all, sharing judicial labor is a task of delicate 
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